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BOOK REVIEW
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, LAW AND PRACTICE. By F. Hodge O'Neal.
Illinois: Callaghan & Company. 1971 (two volumes). Pp. 1330.
$75.00.
We are in the fourteenth year after Professor F. Hodge O'Neal
first pledged his troth, by token of a two volume treatise,' to the
exocratic corporation.2  The 1958 formality, which came after an ex-
tended courtship with -the close corporation,' created what has proven
to be a happy estate for the profession as well as for O'Neal and his
"lady."4  Although she has been prolific of problems (none of his
making, so far as I know), O'Neal has remained attentive and re-
sponsive to her needs, keeping his readers in pocket parts all the
while.' This love affair, by now common knowledge among corpo-
rate lawyers, has generated a certain identity between the name
O'Neal and the law of close corporations."
I F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORAATONS, LAw AND PRACTICE (1st ed. 1958) [herein-
after cited as O'NEAL (1st ed. 1958)].
2 "Our language contains no word to identify the large, publicly held corporation,
whose stock is scattered in small fractions among thousands of shareholders. I shall re-
fer to such corporations here as 'endocratic' corporations ... to distinguish them from
... corporations controlled by a substantial stock ownership - 'exocratic' corporations."
Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible? in E.
MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 303 n.2 (1966).
8 This affair was no mere daliance. The following articles produced by Professor
O'Neal figured prominently in the production of the 1958 work: Molding the Corpo-
rate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (1956) (Chapter IIIE); Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-
Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARV. L. REv. 786 (1954) (Chapter IXC); Giving Share-
holders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special Charter and By-Laws Provi-
sions, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 451 (1953) (Chapter IV); Restrictions on Transfer
of Stock in Closely Held Comporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773
(1952) (Chapter VII). And this is only a sampling of Professor O'Neal's writings.
4 Perhaps it is premature to so characterize the close corporation. In most juris-
dictions, she is still more nearly a tramp. Only four jurisdictions (Delaware, Florida,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania) have enacted so-called "integrated" laws specifically de-
signed to grant concessions to the close corporation. Other states, most notably New
York and North Carolina, have adopted scattered provisions relating to close corpora-
tion problems. See 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, LAW AND PRACTICE §§
1.13a-1.14c (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL (2d ed. 1971)].
5 Supplements were printed for 1963, 1964, and 1966-70.
6 Professor Henn asserts that "f[an extensive body of literature on the subject [of
close corporations] is available to assist the practitioner." H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 512 (2d ed. 1970).
He lists a few citations, id. at 512 n.12, but these are thin soup compared with the lavish
citation of commentary which pervades O'Neal's editions.
Professor William H. Painter has recently entered the field with a major text on
closely held corporations: PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS (1971). See Shipman, Book Review, 85 HARv. L. REV. 527 (1971).
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By bringing us a Second Edition of his treatise, Professor O'Neal
has resolemnized his bond with the still youthful' and developing
apple of his eye. The form of this most recent renewal differs con-
siderably from its 1958 predecessor. Two new compression loose-
leaf binders (spelling an end to clumsy pocket parts) replace the
two bound volumes. But the convenience of footnotes at the bot-
tom of each page is also missing, it having been decided, no doubt,
that placing footnotes at the end of each section would facilitate re-
printing of revised pages. Convenient tables for quick location of
pertinent federal and state statutes and regulations have been added,8
and the index, which may be an "outcome determinative" research
tool, has been improved somewhat, though it was quite adequate in
the First Edition as supplemented.
The principal peculiarities of the dosed corporate form are
known generally to most corporate practitioners, but they bear re-
peating here if only for the purpose of establishing a framework for
analyzing Professor O'Neal's treatment of them. If it be assumed
that the major corporate characteristic of limited liability is to be
granted to a relatively small group of persons in whom both own-
ership and management control are merged,9 perhaps such a group
should also be allowed to deviate from some of the basic ground
rules of corporate life and to relinquish certain unwanted corporate
7 In the preface to his First Edition, Professor O'Neal wrote: "The close corporation
is young, naturally it will continue to grow." 1 O'NEAL vii (1st ed. 1958). But the
close corporation, like a fine lady, bides her age. Some of the toughest policy issues
were joined in the last century. Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (whether
limited liability persists where management and ownership are completely rejoined);
Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. *456, *473 (N.Y. 1822) (dictum) (same issue):
There is nothing of an exclusive nature in the [general corporation] statute;
but the benefits from associating and becoming incorporated, for the pur-
poses held out in the act, are offered to all who conform to its requisitions.
There are no franchises or privileges that are not common to the whole com-
munity.
See 1 O'NEA. §§ 1.05, 1.11 (2d ed. 1971).
82 ONEAL Tables (2d ed. 1971). Listed are: sections of the Internal Revenue Code
and regulations and rulings thereunder; federal securities laws and related rules and re-
leases, together with certain miscellaneous United States Code provisions; state consti-
tutional and statutory material; model and uniform act references; and a group of foreign
citations. These are in addition to the table of cases.
9 This is no mean supposition, but it is too late in the day to challenge it. As an
original proposition, it might be argued that the corporate attribute of limited liabil-
ity, not contained in some early corporation laws, was a hard-won concession, bargained
and given in exchange for shareholder surrender of everyday management prerogatives
within the context of a relatively widely held corporation. Thus, it can be said that the
dose corporation (if such be defined to require the coalescence of control and owner-
ship) inherently contravenes the original policy of the corporation laws and the general
policy applicable to unincorporated associations as well. But that battle is behind us.
See note 7 supra.
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attributes, provided the participants fully understand their arrange-
ments and observe their fiduciary responsibilities, and so long as "out-
side" senior equity holders and creditors are not harmed. Ingenuity
has not been flatly barred, and, over the years, much energy has
been devoted to the elaborate art of adapting general business cor-
poration laws to the realities of closed corporate behavior. All this
bending, molding, cutting, and embellishing has produced a separate
regimen - a special mix of statutes, organizational documents, and
contracts - to govern the close corporation, whose typical activities
and objectives tend to distinguish it in several important respects
from the more widely held species. First, common equity holders
in the closed form are more intimately involved in management
decisionmaking. Second, the ownership group is exclusive. Third,
since shareholders have greater control and are more closely knit,
fiduciary duties, in some respects at least, are pegged at a higher
level. These distinctive features are the source of an array of legal
issues with which the conscientious lawyer must deal. The new
edition of Professor O'Neal's treatise, even more thorough and ex-
haustive than his first, will be a helpful and comforting companion
to those who must confront the many facets of the close corpora-
tion phenomenon.
The goal of radically greater shareholder involvement in the
ordinary conduct of corporate affairs can be achieved only by neu-
tralizing the normal split-level statutory control structure which
draws a bright line between director and shareholder domains, sets
a pattern of majority or smaller quorums and votes at both board
and shareholder levels (with some exceptions regarding fundamen-
tal changes), and reposes immediate control in the hands of a few
whom the majority have elected. Until the distinction between
board and shareholder decisionmaking has been entirely eliminated
by statute for close corporations - as it has been in some states"0
- judicial inhibitions engendered by the two-tier system will haunt
the most careful planner. However, limited special statutes, provi-
sions in articles and by-laws, and private agreements can be em-
ployed, alone or in combination, to short many circuits of the busi-
ness corporation laws. With these tools, it is possible to achieve
much of the flexibility allowed under general partnership law."
10 The principal means by which the barriers have been eliminated are (1) statutes
which make it unnecessary for a close corporation to have a board and (2) statutes which
permit allocation of director power to shareholders by organizational document pro-
visions and private agreements. See 1 O'NEAL §§ 5.07a, 5.21 (2d ed. 1971).
11 The realistic "norms" for many close corporations are stated more accurately,
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O'Neal treats extensively the means by which a shareholder can
gain and protect substantial rights to participate in the immedate
control of his corporation's business, either directly or by effective
representation. In Chapters 3D, 3E (to some extent), 4, and 5,
O'Neal details the manner in which control can be allocated by 1)
classifying stock, 2) tailoring articles and by-laws to create power
distribution and protection mechanisms (such as high quorum and
high or unanimous vote requirements), and 3) constructing an over-
lay of contractual arrangements (such as shareholders' agreements,
voting trusts, irrevocable proxies, and contracts delegating manage-
ment functions). Another mode of ensconsing power at the execu-
tive and operating levels is discussed in Chapter 6, which is devoted
primarily to employment contracts.
When shareholders are permitted a greater voice in management
decisionmaking, even to the point of having veto power on specific
matters, the incidence of deadlock, accompanied by corporate stag-
nation or worse, is certain to rise. The possibility of deadlock and
the ways of lessening its shock are perennial topics of lively debate
among corporate practitioners. In Chapter 9, Professor O'Neal
canvasses the methods of planning for and coping with this fre-
quently terminal malady to which so many close corporations are sus-
ceptible. He devotes nearly seventy pages to the "hope" offered by
arbitration as an alternative to other approaches, such as buyout ar-
rangements, special dissolution agreements, divisive reorganizations,
independent board appointments, and statutory dissolution. He
frankly admits, however, that "formidable obstacles" lie in the path
of lawyers who contemplate use of arbitration techniques to pro-
duce more satisfactory answers to the problems of the "unhappy
corporation." One little noticed impediment to comprehensive ar-
bitration is the antiwaiver concept which is codified in the securities
laws.12 Prospective arbitration arrangements which purport to cover
unknown securities claims have not received favorable treatment
in the courts. Since it is likely that more and more controversies
involving corporate management duties will include securities viola-
tions, particularly under antifraud doctrines, the judicial hostility
to precontroversy waiver of securities rights must be reckoned
with. 13
perhaps, in sections 18 and 31 of the Uniform Partnership Act than in the typical gen-
eral business corporation law.
12 Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970); UNIFORM SECURuTIES ACT § 410(g).
_1 Though it has been under heavy attack recently, the notion that precontroversy
19721
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:976
Another byproduct of blending ownership and control in a few
shareholders is the need for simplifying the formalities of taking
corporate action. However, corporate ritual cannot be cashiered al-
together without raising the danger of losing the shield of limited
liability. The participants owe themselves and their creditors a de-
gree of discipline which produces a clear record of corporate action
and which segregates corporate behavior from the purely personal
acts of the participants. There is no policy justification for failing
to tend record books, commingling assets, and treating corporate
obligations as personal debts. Even if integrated close corporation
laws become commonplace, it is unlikely that such behavior will be
countenanced while the veil of limited liability remains unrent. This
is not to say, however, that there is no call for taking some of the
starch out of corporate procedures, especially where ownership and
management are more or less fused. O'Neal treats these points
quite adequately in the first sections of Chapter 8, which covers
several "problems of operation."'14
Understandably, there is considerable clannishness built into
most close corporations. To preserve the privacy of the enterprise,
barriers are erected against unwanted strangers. Transfer restric-
tions (with first options) and buyout arrangements are the chief
means of shutting out unacceptable intruders and providing fair
payment to participants who wish to sever their ties with the corpo-
ration. In Chapter 7, O'Neal elaborates upon the principles govern-
ing restraints, first options, buy-sell contracts, and stock repurchase
agreements.15 He devotes a group of helpful new sections to the
various methods of valuation which may be used in setting the price
of shares to be transferred pursuant to restrictions or buyout ar-
rangements.
Although the foregoing may tend to prove otherwise, widely
held and closed corporate forms do share some common ground.
The law relating to the duties of managers and dominant share-
holders seems serviceable in both contexts and cross-transferable
arbitration agreements violate the antiwaiver provisions is still alive. Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
14See also 1 O'NEAL § 3.62 (2d ed. 1971), where the author warns that too much
informality may result in unlimited personal liability.
15 One of the more important questions under the heading of corporate repur-
chases is how the "surplus" and "equity insolvency" tests should be applied to periodic
payments made by a corporation pursuant to an installment buyout agreement. See,
e.g., McConnell v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362 (9th Cit. 1968); Palmer v. Justice,
322 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn.
159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967).
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between them. As part of his chapter on operational problems
(Chapter 8, already adverted to), O'Neal does a fine job of catalog-
ing and explaining the diverse forms of troublesome fiduciary be-
havior endemic to corporate life. The discussion includes a section
devoted to the federal corporation law which has developed under
securities statutes and regulations.' 6 My prediction is that this por-
tion of the treatise is in for some expansion as federal antifraud con-
cepts are fleshed out to cover more misdeeds involving the disposi-
tion and holding of securities. Close corporation controversies have
stimulated much of the federal implied private right doctrine.'7 A
striking recent example is Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc.,'8 in
which a New Jersey district court has dealt another major blow to
the much circumscribed but stubbornly persistent holding of the
Birnbaum9"-case, which requires certain private plantiffs suing un-
der Rule lob-5 to be purchasers or sellers of securities.- Tully in-
volved a sort of majority squeezeout, executed by directors who
caused the corporation to sell treasury stock to themselves and others
for the purpose of shifting voting control. Since the plaintiffs were
neither purchasers nor sellers of securities, the defendant directors
naturally invoked Birnbaum. With Birnbaum alive, the plaintiffs'
only recourse would have been to state law remedies.2 0 But, unless
an appeal ensues and the Third Circuit reverses, we might be able
to say that Birnbaum, already pruned- to the shaft, has finally been
felled.21 The more critical point, however, is that yet another "Main
16 2 O'NAL § 8.16 (2d ed. 1971). References to securities law remedies for par-
ticular types of conduct are found in other sections. See, e.g., id. §§ 8.08 (compelling
declaration of dividends), 8.09 (issuance of shares to managers at less than true value).
Securities-type corporate common law need not be exclusively federal in character.
In those states where implied private claims are not expressly negated by statute, a new
case law of corporations can develop under the influence of the more protective philos-
ophy of securities regulation. See, e.g., Shermer v. Baker, 472 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1970) (implied private claim under § 101 of the Uniform Securities Act for in-
sider trading). A case like Shermer directly overlaps traditional insider trading doc-
trine such as that applied in Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 492 P.2d 43 (Idaho
Sup. Ct. 1972).
17 It was in a case involving a close corporation that the Supreme Court explicitly
held for the first time that an implied private civil claim could be based on SEC Rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971). Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
18 [1971-72 Transfer Binder) CCH ED. SEc. L. REP. 5 93,377 (D.NJ. Feb. 2,
1972).
19 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
2 0 E.g., Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1963).
211 say 'might" because the holding of the Tally case extends only to plaintiffs
seeking retrospective equitable relief (invalidation of corporate action) under Rule lOb-
5. The courts have drawn distinctions based on the kinds of relief sought in Rule
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Street" corporate problem may have entered the world of federal
securities regulation.
A group of preorganization planning topics, mainly taxation and
initial capitalization, are taken up in Chapter 2. Since publication
of the First Edition, O'Neal has been expanding his coverage of tax
matters, and the sections on initial tax planning seem comprehen-
sive.22 One notices some lacunae, 2' but the text identifies the issues
which can be pursued at greater length in standard tax sources.
Perhaps this chapter could be improved by some additional discus-
sion of the factors which should be considered in allocating interests
(net assets, profits, and voting) among enterprise participants. More
extensive commentary on problems of valuation, especially as they
relate to the incorporation of a going concern, would also seem
proper for inclusion in Chapter 2. However, the new material on
valuation which has been added to Chapter 7 (on restrictive options
and buyout agreements) can be adapted to issues arising in the or-
ganizational phase.
In the last section of Chapter 1, a section which might have
been better placed in Chapter 2, O'Neal alerts the reader to the fact
that federal and state securities laws might have a significant impact
on the issuance of a close corporation's securities. He furnishes
short descriptions of the private offering, intrastate, and small offer-
ing exemptions, but he does not develop the theoretical and prac-
tical sides of this important planning topic. Nonetheless, there is
sufficient warning to the careful practitioner that he must look fur-
ther. We may expect a quick rewrite and embellishment of this
section (perhaps before this review is published), because of recent
changes in the law regarding private and small offerings and statu-
10b-5 cases. In some circuits, non-purchasers and non-sellers who seek prospective
equitable relief are given standing to sue, while those who seek damages are denied the
right to proceed under Rule lob-5. Tully, if allowed to stand, may be circumscribed
as an "equitable relief" case.
22 Subchapter S, section 1244 stock, multiple corporations, thin capitalization, bail-
out devices, section 351, and personal holding company status are covered in Chapter
2. Other tax matters, such as redemptions, compensation, and accumulated earnings,
are meshed nicely with related corporate law questions later in the text. The Supreme
Court has been spending a good deal of time recently on close corporation tax prob-
lems. See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970) (redemption); United States
v. Donruss, 393 U.S. 297 (1969) (accumulated earnings); United States v. Generes,
40 U.S.L.W. 4196 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1972) (loss deductions).
23 Some mention of collapsible corporations would not be out of place. In connec-
tion with the section 351 discussion, it might be proper to mention the tricks that the
Commissioner can play under the "nominal property" rule in Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii). Also of interest would be the tax treatment of bad debt reserves
and accounts receivable upon incorporation. See Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1
(1970) (bad debt reserve); Peter Raich, 46 T. C. 604 (1966) (accounts receivable).
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tory underwriters.24 These are developments with which close cor-
poration counsel must be familiar. Unfortunately, there are those
who do not appreciate the extent to which -their close corporation
clients are affected by federal and state securities regulation at the
point of issuance. Many either overlook the laws or misconstrue
exemptions.2" The latter habit stems, I believe, from the erroneous
assumption that the nature of all close corporations is such that
some exemption (primarily that for private offerings) is always avail-
able. Such a conclusion is unwarranted, whatever the essential char-
acteristics of the close corporation might be. The criteria for identi-
fying the close corporation have been stated to be: fewness of share-
holders, lack of a market for shares, treatment by participants of
one another as partners, and merger of ownership and manage-
ment control. It cannot be generally concluded -that such attributes,
either singly or cumulatively, entitle a corporation to exemptions
from federal or state legislation. It is lamentable that there are not
more sources which fully explain the securities implications of is-
suance by a close corporation.
A group of other less extensively treated topics are scattered,
though not illogically placed, throughout the two volumes. Among
these are: the corporate veil,26 choosing the proper business form27
indemnification, 8  employee compensation,29  and antivoidability
standards for salvaging conflict of interest transactions.30 A little
surprising is O'Neal's cursory treatment of provisions which deal
with conflicts of interest. Abrogation of the strict rule of void-
ability seems warranted. Many statutes and organizational docu-
2 4 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (1972) (new Rule
144); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5224, 37 Fed. Reg. 590 (1972) (new small offer-
ing exemption); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5225, 37 Fed. Reg. 599 (1972) (modi-
fications of Regulation A); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226, 37 Fed. Reg. 600
(1972) (fraud implications of private offerings).
25In Ohio, for example, we have only a very limited quasi-exemption for the
first sale of the voting shares of a corporation which has no more than five share-
holders after such sale, but only if the exemption is formally claimed. OHIo REV.
CODE § 1707.03(0) (Page 1964). Preorganization subscriptions, which are dearly
securities, are eligible only for a fairly narrow exemption. Id. § 1707.03(K)(3). On
the debt side, our statute provides a private offering exemption. Id. § 1707.02(G)
(subject to a quaint unwritten administrative policy limiting its use to officer and di-
rector offerees). All this certainly gives counsel for the close corporation something to
think about.
26 1 O'NEAL §§ 1.09-.10 (2d ed. 1971).
27 Id. §§ 2.03-.04.
2 8 Id. § 3.67.
2 9Id. §§ 3.69, 8.10-.14a.
30 Id. § 3.66.
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ments go further, however, and purport to completely validate fidu-
ciary transactions by foreclosing, under certain conditions, any
inquiry into the question of fairness.3 ' As we know from the Remil-
lard Brick Co. case, 32 courts might be expected to resist such un-
usual shifts from the common law, even in the face of compelling
plain meaning arguments. This ought to be mentioned. Indemni-
fication, too, is an area where the responsibility gaps created by wide
open corporate statutes are being filled by regulatory restrictions,
especially under the aegis of the securities laws.
Professor O'Neal is an obvious partisan in favor of comprehen-
sive statutory schemes designed especially for close corporations. 3
Such an approach seems preferable to the philosophy of forcing a
single statute to perform double duty by interlarding it with sections
designed to afford "relief" to the closed corporate form. The latter
process, while dispensing legitimate flexibility to close corporations,
introduces some very troublesome opportunities for abuse by publicly
held enterprises. What is good for the principals of Main Street
Motors is not necessarily good for the shareholders of American
Motors, and those who tinker with business corporation laws under
the guise of perfecting a rational scheme for the incorporated part-
nership should consider the ill effects which might accrue from an
unlimited reflux of close corporation principles into an environment
where ownership is not in control.34
31 See, e.g., id. §§ 10.03, 10.20.
3 2 Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.
2d 66 (1952) (holding that fairness is an issue even where a transaction has been ap-
proved by a fully informed majority of shareholders, notwithstanding statutory indica-
tions to the contrary). Under the old New York statute, the Remillard decision would
probably have been followed, but New York has recently amended its conflict of interest
section so as to make such a result more difficult. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 713 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1971). The drafters of the 1967 Delaware law revisions (as contrasted
with the Delaware legislature) did not intend to adopt the Remillard approach. 2 P-H
CORP. (Del.) at 326-27 (1967). But the Delaware courts have not yet spoken. Ohio
is headed for adoption of a "validation" provision. See 45 OHIo B. 719, 727 (1972).
As a member of the committee which prepared the proposal, I am aware of some feel-
ing that the effects of Remillard were not desired, but here again we are talking about
the thinking of a bar association committee and not the intent of the General Assembly.
33 See 1 O'NEAL §§ 1.12 -.14c (2d ed. 1971).
34 Consider, for example, the Model Business Corporation Act, which provides that
management of a corporation may be vested by the articles in anyone. ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CoRp. Act § 35 (1969). Though such a provision legitimately facili-
tates the operation of close corporations, it also allows directors of widely held busi-
nesses to push separation of ownership from control to a point where shareholders can
no longer change policy by voting directors out of office. Thus, those who actually run
the corporation can be completely unaccountable to the shareholders. This indiscrimi-
nate unraveling of the corporate fabric should be compared with the more cautious ap-
proach taken in New York, where latitude for close corporations is achieved with some
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The preceding comments have been directed to O'Neal's deft,
precise, and separate handling of each of the peculiar needs of the
dose corporation. But the treatise furnishes yet another perspective:
one that concentrates on broader planning aspects which cut across
a number of specific problems. To illustrate, a substantial part of
Chapter 3 is devoted to general considerations regarding the creative
use of articles and by-law provisions, and a good portion of Chapter
5 identifies the common themes which recur in shareholder agree-
ments.35
There is an unmistakably empirical tone to the entire text.
O'Neal's own experience and his ongoing dialogue with other law-
yers probably account for the air of praxis which pervades his analy-
sis. The most utterly bread-and-butter aspect of the treatise is Chap-
ter, 10, which contains a number of very dean and intelligible
specimen charter, by-law, and contract provisions& These originate
or are adapted from cases and other generally reliable sources. They
are accompanied by explanatory footnotes and cross-references to
relevant textual discussions.
The structure and sequencing of the material reflect O'Neal's
many years as teacher and writer. He follows the extremely helpful
pattern of beginning each chapter with a delineation of its suqbject
matter. He also includes a sketch of the practical context to which
each chapter is relevant. Chapter 1, which surveys the "distinctive
needs" of the dose corporation, serves the same function with respect
to the treatise as a whole. This technique is a valuable aid to insight,
and it is well worth the user's extra time to refer frequently to these
pathfinders.
Before reading through the Second Edition, I tested its response
to a group of specific questions in order to find out how the text and
ancillary aids function together and how deeply my problems could
be pursued. There were only a few instances where I felt less than
amply enlightened. Citation to modern authority is extensive, and,
whenever concepts overlap, flags are set to advise the reader that
reference to analogous topics might be fruitful.
safeguards against unwanted side effects. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620 (McKinney
1963).
8 5 For instance, shareholder agreements are subject, more or less and depending
on statutory pronouncements, to a prohibition against unreasonable encroachment upon
unfettered director discretion. The Court of Appeals of New York has recently aug-
mented its line of cases on this subject. Glekel v. Gluck, 30 N.Y. 2d 93, 281 N.E.2d
171 (1972) (holding that an agreement which bound a director to use his best efforts
to cause a registration of another shareholder's stock was not an unreasonable infringe-
ment on director prerogatives).
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One who undertakes to review a treatise does so with a certain
dread that his task might become a little like reading the telephone
book. I found no such tedium in the O'Neal work. His style is
crisp and, as the promotional flyer puts it, "actually . . . enjoyable."
The same sales blurb states that "[t]he revision continues to reflect
the original volume's philosophy of avoiding an overly conceptual-
istic approach by focusing on planning, drafting, counseling and
preventive law rather than on doctrine or curative law." This re-
mark should not be taken to indicate that the treatise is short on
policy analysis. One of the most attractive attributes of O'Neal's ap-
proach is his careful explanation of rhyme and reason. On the
other hand, lest any potential users be repelled by the prospect of
solid scholarship, it must be noted again that O'Neal has skillfully
channeled his theoretical analysis into an array of practical settings.
Every law office, including and perhaps most especially the small
firm, should avail itself of this fine new edition of a respected cor-
porate standby.
RONALD J. COFFEY*
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